The article examines the record of compliance with the UN Committee against Torture’s decisions in individual complaints cases. Theoretically, I expect that compliance will be the outcome of a combination of normative and rationalist factors: States committed to human rights protection will comply even in the absence of enforcement but only as long as compliance costs remain relatively low. Using a data set covering all adverse decisions issued until 2018 and information on their compliance status, I employ fuzzy-set qualitative comparative (...) analysis to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for the outcomes of compliance and noncompliance. The analysis reveals that the conditions tested—liberal democracy, nonuse of political terror, violation type, and strong civil society—are in part individually (near-)necessary and jointly sufficient for compliance, while the presence of their complements is consistent with noncompliance. The Committee against Torture thus appears to be able to elicit (some) state compliance with its decisions, if mostly only with respect to certain kinds of states and select types of violations. (shrink)

Du point de vue méthodologique et épistémologique, la vision occupe une place privilégiée dans les œuvres de Galien de Pergame, ce qui explique les tentatives répétées de ce dernier pour en expliquer le fonctionnement. En partie grâce à la dissection et à la vivisection pratiquées sur des animaux de différentes espèces, il développa une connaissance détaillée de l’anatomie de l’œil, du nerf optique, du cerveau, des muscles oculaires et du système vasculaire cérébral et oculaire. Il utilisa avec habileté cet impressionnant (...) savoir anatomique pour élaborer une explication détaillée de la physiologie de la vision. Pour expliquer comment voient les êtres humains, il fit également appel à l’optique mathématique, notamment à l’optique euclidienne. Cependant, en dépit d’efforts remarquables pour intégrer anatomie, physiologie et mathématiques dans une unique théorie cohérente de la vision, une analyse plus attentive montre que son explication de la vision n’est pas exempte de lacunes non négligeables, de difficultés non résolues et de tensions internes. (shrink)

Herophilus, a contemporary of Euclid, practiced medicine in Alexandria in the third century B.C., and seems to have been the first Western scientist to dissect the human body. He made especially impressive contributions to many branches of anatomy and also developed influential views on many other aspects of medicine. Von Staden assembles the fragmentary evidence concerning one of the more important scientists of ancient Greece. Part 1 of the book presents the Greek and Latin texts accompanied by English translation (...) and interpretative commentary. Significant background information is given in the introductory essay preceding each chapter. Part 2 briefly sketches the major developments within the Herophilean school after Herophilus, and discusses the individual members within it. Anyone interested in the history of science, the history of medicine, or intellectual history will find this book a rich source of information about an unusual and important aspect of Greek culture. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.1 (2001) 142-143 [Access article in PDF] Wright, John P. and Paul Potter, editors. Psyche and Soma: Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind-Body Problem from Antiquity to Enlightenment. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. xii + 298. Cloth, $72.00. The mind-body problem has a long history that begins well before Descartes made it extreme by presenting mind as unextended active thinking and (...) matter as unthinking passive extension. This absolute division was motivated in some part by the desire to present the soul as an entity that can survive the death of the body. This is difficult to maintain if the soul is merely the form or the vital force motivating a human body. But the advance of physiology has led more and more to the conclusion that the functions often attributed to the soul are actually carried out by the brain. Thinking may be as natural (and perhaps as determined) a function of the body as is digestion. And if digestion does not survive the death of the body, maybe thinking does not either.This collection of studies provides a detailed introduction to both medical and metaphysical views and theories concerning the relation of mind to body. In particular, the first article by Beate Gundert on Hippocratic Medicine sets the stage by showing that "mind and body in the Hippocratic writings, while distinguished empirically by being related to different types of phenomena, are both ultimately accounted for by the same explanatory model: Human nature (physis), which embraces the totality of bodily structures, physiological processes, and psychic events" (35). T. M. Robinson shows that Plato admits of no solution as to how mind and body interact, and Philip J. van der Eijk argues that "to detach the essence of man completely from his physical make-up would run counter to Aristotle's biological approach to man as a natural living being, the ultimate implication of his view on the divinity of nous is that the fullest realization of what it is to be a human being is to go beyond the limits of corporeality and mortality, and to become, if only temporarily, a god" (77). Heinrich von Staden covers Epicurus, Herophilus, Erasistratus, the Stoics, and Galen, concluding that "The discovery of the nerves entailed the first significant erosion of the vast territory ruled by the soul in Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy, an erosion accompanied by an expansion of the rule of 'nature,' visible not only in medicine, but also in philosophy" (116). Theo K. Heckel discusses Saint Paul's insistence upon the whole person, and Gareth Matthews shows that, prior to Descartes, Augustine presents "a radically new argument for mind-body dualism... an internalist argument... that proceeds from what, allegedly, the mind can know concerning itself to the conclusion that the mind is incorporeal" (145). Emily Michael discusses Pomponazzi's view that we know the immortality of the soul only by faith and the scholastic attempts to show that the soul is a substantial form. Guillaume Lamy, for example, criticized Descartes for having a soul only of thinking, whereas the soul must be of life. Steven Voss shows how at the end of his life, Descartes did discuss in detail how thinking affects the body, particularly in the management of health and the curing of disease. But Descartes does not solve the problem of how this interaction takes place. Thomas Lennon discusses the views of Bayle on Leibniz's monadic forces and Locke's fideism. And Francois Duchesneu continues the discussion of Stahl and Leibniz, to [End Page 142] conclude that "Leibniz attempts to discover the formal foundation of the organism, which he locates in the capacity of perception-appetition proper to the dominant monad" (235).John P. Wright gives an exposition of a very important distinction between Cartesian dualism and the functional dualism that came to dominate medical thought, that is, the question of how the brain and vital organs interact. Roselyn Rey carries this discussion on to the development of theories... (shrink)

Since the publication of our article on Thucydides and the Plague of Athens, Dr Heinrich von Staden of Yale University has kindly drawn our attention to a paper by Eby and Evjen suggesting that the Plague was glanders. We do not think that this diagnosis can possibly be correct, though there are undoubtedly some points in its favour. The authors have argued their case as persuasively as possible, and the proposal has sufficient merit to deserve a serious reply.

22 page Critical Notice of Herophilus: The Art of Medicine in Early Alexandria by Heinrich von Staden. Sections IV and V deal with the question of Herophilus' views in epistemology and his relation to skepticism.

Botha, PJ - Deist, FE Le Roux, JH 1987. Revolution and reinterpretation: Chapters from the history of Israel. (Bladsy 201)Geyser, PA - De Villiers, PGR 1987. Liberation theology and the Bible. (Bladsy 203)Naudé, RM - Kriel, JR 1988. Removing medicine’s cartesian mask: The problem of humanising medical education. (Bladsy 206)Stander, HF - Ferguson, E 1987. Backgrounds of early Christianity. (Bladsy 207)Stander, HF - Durst, M 1987. Die Eschatologie des Hilarius von Poitiers: Ein Beitrag zur Dogmengeschichte des vierten Jahrliunderts. (Bladsy 209)Storm, (...) JMG - Loubser, JA 1987. The apartheid Bible. A critical review of racial theology in South Africa. (Bladsy 212)Van der Merwe, PJ - Krüger, JS 1988. Aandag, kalmte en insig. (Bladsy 215)Van der Merwe, JC - Van der Walt, BJ 1988. My roeping as Christenjongmens in die huidige Suid-Afrika. (Bladsy 217)Van der Westhuizen, HG - Van Houten, RL 1988. The Message of Harare. (Bladsy 222)Van der Westhuizen, HG - Du Preez, J 1988. Die aantrekkingskrag van die Marxisme vir die Derde Wereld. (Bladsy 225)Van Staden, AJ - Algemene Kommissie vir die Diens van Barmhartigheid van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk 1986. Die diakonaat en die alkohol- en dwelmaflianklike. (Bladsy 227). (shrink)

It is a recurring mantra that epistemic must creates a statement that is weaker than the corresponding flat-footed assertion: It must be raining vs. It’s raining. Contrary to classic discussions of the phenomenon such as by Karttunen, Kratzer, and Veltman, we argue that instead of having a weak semantics, must presupposes the presence of an indirect inference or deduction rather than of a direct observation. This is independent of the strength of the claim being made. Epistemic must is therefore quite (...) similar to evidential markers of indirect evidence known from languages with rich evidential systems. We work towards a formalization of the evidential component, relying on a structured model of information states (analogous to some models used in the belief dynamics literature). We explain why in many contexts, one can perceive a lack of confidence on the part of the speaker who uses must. (shrink)

The compositional semantics of sentences like Only mammals give live birth and The flag flies only if the Queen is home is a tough problem. Evidence is presented to show that only here is modifying an underlying proposition (its ‘prejacent’). After discussing the semantics of only, the question of the proper interpretation of the prejacent is explored. It would be nice if the prejacent could be analyzed as having existential quantificational force. But that is difficult to maintain, since the prejacent (...) structures when encountered on their own are naturally read as having a lawlike flavor, which in many analyses is attributed to the semantics of implicit operators alleged to be present in them. In the end, an analysis is presented which attributes some very particular properties to these operators and thereby succeeds in providing the target sentences with intuitively adequate interpretations. These complex constructions can therefore be used as a probe into the nature of implicit quantification in natural language. (shrink)

Collective emotions are at the heart of any society and become evident in gatherings, crowds, or responses to widely salient events. However, they remain poorly understood and conceptualized in scientific terms. Here, we provide first steps towards a theory of collective emotions. We first review accounts of the social and cultural embeddedness of emotion that contribute to understanding collective emotions from three broad perspectives: face-to-face encounters, culture and shared knowledge, and identification with a social collective. In discussing their strengths and (...) shortcomings and highlighting areas of conceptual overlap, we translate these views into a number of bottom–up mechanisms that explain collective emotion elicitation on the levels of social cognition, expressive behavior, and social practices. (shrink)

1 This paper has been presented at the workshop “Time and Modality: A Round Table on Tense, Mood, and Modality”, Paris, December 2005, at a CUNY linguistics colloquium in May 2006, and at the 6th Workshop on Formal Linguistics in Florian´opolis, Brazil, August 2006. We thank the audiences at those presentations, in particular Orin Percus, Tim Stowell, Marcel den Dikken, Anna Szabolcsi, Chris Warnasch, Roberta Pires de Oliveira, Renato Miguel Basso, and Ana M¨uller. We thank Noam Chomsky, Cleo Condoravdi, and (...) Irene Heim for very helpful conversations about this material. We thank Bridget Copley for sharing with us her recent manuscript “What Should Should.. (shrink)

This paper is mainly concerned with tense in embedded constructions. I believe that recent research – notably the work by Ogihara (1989) and Abusch (1993) – has contributed much to our better understanding of its semantics. The proposals made by the two authors are, however, still too simplistic in some regards. Among other things, they neglect the interplay of tense with temporal adverbs of quantification and with frame-setters. To get this composition right is a touchstone for every theory of tense (...) and tense semanticists have been concerned with this problem from the beginning on, as witnessed by the analyses in Kratzer (1978), Bäuerle (1979), Dowty (1979/1982), to mention a few. (shrink)

The interpretation of if -clauses in the scope of ordinary quantifiers has provoked semanticists into extraordinary measures, such as abandoning compositionality or claiming that if has no meaning. We argue that if -clauses have a normal conditional meaning, even in the scope of ordinary quantifiers, and that the trick is to have the right semantics for conditionals.

In recent work, Louis deRosset (Philosophical Studies 149:73–97, 2010) has argued that priority theorists, who hold that truths about macroscopic objects can be metaphysically explained without reference to such things, cannot meet an independently motivated constraint upon good explanation. By clarifying the nature of the priority theorist’s project, I argue that deRosset’s argument fails to establish its conclusion.

A normalization procedure is given for classical natural deduction with the standard rule of indirect proof applied to arbitrary formulas. For normal derivability and the subformula property, it is sufficient to permute down instances of indirect proof whenever they have been used for concluding a major premiss of an elimination rule. The result applies even to natural deduction for classical modal logic.

It is well known that indefinite phrases are more liberal in taking scope than other quantifying phrases. In general, the scope of indefinites is not limited by the finite clause in which they occur, although the scope of universal quantifiers is. Wh-phrases behave very much like indefinites: in languages with wh in situ, their scope need not be restricted by anything like clause boundedness.